INTRODUCTION
The military has become an important factor in African politics.
Prior to 1966 any discussion on African politics could have scarcely mentioned the military. But after wards, it became difficult to fully discuss or analyze African politics without a prominent place being accorded to the military. Almost every country, in the continent has witnessed either a military coup or has been threatened by one. Despite the current spate of democratization in the continent the role of the military either as the guarantor of state’s security or the custodian of constitutional order is still pivotal. This unit examines the origins of military institution in Africa, the erosion of its professionalism as a result of its involvement in politics, and the role of the military as a modernization agent in Africa.
OBJECTIVES
At the end of this unit, you are expected to:
- understand the role of the military in African politics
- explain the reasons why the military has invited itself or been invited as an arbiter in political conflicts
- understand how military professionalism has suffered under theimpact of military involvement in politics
- appreciate the imperative for the military to revert to its constitutional role, and resist the temptations for overt political role.
Origins and the Changing Role of Military Institution in Africa
The military in Africa, as it exists today, was created by colonial rule to enhance its imperial interests. It was conceived as a vital wing of the colonial apparatus to pacify the various groups, and defend various territories against external aggression. The nature of the military which African states inherited at independence reflected the different colonial policies of the Imperial powers. While the military in the British were trained at, mainly, Sadhurst military school, those from French territories were brought together under the Federation of French West Africa. But despite the differences, from one country to another, the common pattern is that the military in independent Africa did not severe links with the former colonial authorities.In most African states, they also shared the pattern of recruitment, largely drawing the rank and file from one ethnic group, a relatively small size at independence, but which was enlarged as situation demanded. For example, in 1966 the size of the Nigerian army was 10,506 men, the officers corps was only 51 of whom 330 were of combat status (Luckham 1975:90). But the small size does not stop the military from intervention in politics. When the Togolese military staged a coup in 1966, it has a total of 250 soldiers.
The phenomenon of coup in Africa which first began in Egypt in 1952 is a reflection of the changing perception of the military about its role in the political system. What S.P. Huntington (1964) in the “Soldier and the State” referred to as “the general politicization of social forces and institutions” occurred when the military felt, it had values that extended beyond defence, but also included a sense of how society should be organized. But the military cannot do this without subverting its tradition of professionalism, political neutrality and subordination to political leadership.
Every military regime, no matter how benevolent, is usually described as an aberration. It is considered as a violation of the military’s guardian role in the body polity, and a prescription for recurring instability. By its training and disposition, the military is ill-suited for the civil society, and by its nature, it is inherently unstable because it does not provide established mechanisms for orderly succession. As Odetola (1978) argues, because the military is commandist in structure and paternalistic in orientation, its basic norms and values run counter to the objectives of a democratic and developing society.
The military’s projection of its custodian role to include overt political role, has consequently damaged its professionalism, and created what Howe (2001:2) described as “the tension between military capabilities and political responsibility.”
Military professionalism is a two-way traffic. Civilian and military officials agree not to cross the divide into each others’ affairs. A professional military enjoys considerable jurisdiction in military matters: selection and promotion of personnel based on merit, command, control, communication, intelligence and logistics done under military hierarchy. It also accepts state control and subsumes sub regional loyalties. Where professionalism is the rule unpopular military incursions into “foreign” terrain are resisted. But in most African states the civil-military divide has been breached by civilians attempting to manipulate military affairs, and by the military officers who pursue political control of the state. The consequence of this is that since 1963, Africa has witnessed about ninety military coups. In both Chad and Uganda former insurgents have assumed power. In the 1990s, the armies in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone collapsed entirely. Botswana has enjoyed relative stability from insurgency, while the militaries in Senegal and Zambia have not staged coups (Howe 2001: 2-5).
We can now identity factors that have contributed to lack of professionalism in African military institution.
i. Personal Rule: In Africa personal rulers are more concerned for political loyalty rather than that military efficiency. Since the interests of the new regimes and rulers, rather than those of the state are more paramount to African leaders, they prefer to sacrifice long-term institutionalization for short-term political expediency. According to Michael Schatzbeg, “One of the things Mobutu fears most is an effective military establishment”. To assure him of loyalty of the military, Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone made the military an extension of his party - All Peoples Congress (APC).
ii.Ethnic Recruitment: In Africa personal rule is closely linked with the ethnicization of the military. Crawford young (1994) has observed that “the very nature of personal autocracy led rulers to build armies according to ethnic map”. In Liberia Samuel Doe appointed fellow Krahn, a group that comprised 4 percent of the country’s population to top military posts. Siad Barre also transformed the Somali armed forces into a faction of the Maraheen ethnic group. In Kenya, Jomo removed soldiers of kamba extraction and replaced them with his Kikuyi tribesman.
iii.Lop Sided Promotion: Rapid promotion which led to early retirements of competent officers robbed African military of expertise at the top echelons, and promoted patron-client syndrome. In Uganda, Idi Amin, within ten years, rose from effendi rank (between non-commissioned to a commissioned) to general. Coups de tat also depleted the military of seasoned officers, fractured existing command structure, and sowed the seeds of counter coups in many African states.
iv.Domestic Deployment: Militaries have been traditionally trained for external combat. But in Africa they have been repeatedly engaged to suppress domestic uprising. Its notable effect is to narrow the division between civilian and military autonomy, weakens the force’s unity, diminish its acceptance by the society as a neutral force, and reduces its external capabilities.
v.Creation of Parallel Forces: In Africa, due to rulers’ fears and suspicions of the regular force, they have promoted the idea of parallel security forces, as counter-weights. In the 1960s, Nkrumah had his President’s Own Guard Regiment (POGR), Siaka Stevens’s Special Security Division, Mobutu sese seko’s Division specials Presidentielle and Sanni Abacha’s Special Body Guard service. It is common for these parallel forces to prosper at the expense of the army, thus eroding on professionalism. Indeed, Kenya Services Unit, created by Daniel Arap Moi, was reputed to be capable of defeating the entire army by itself (Howe 2001.44)
vi.Corruption: By focusing officer’s attention on private gains, corruption continues to undermine professionalism in African military. In Nigeria, for example the settlement device was extended by Babangida to the military establishment. In Uganda, President Museveni could not act against General Salim Saleh, half brother and hero of the guerrilla struggle, even after he was indicted for corruption. The list is longer. Biya of Cameroon has his Beti, Eyadema of Togo had his Kabre and Moi of Kenya, his Kalenjin. Commenting on this unholy union, Decalo (1989) wrote “the glue binding military elites to civilian authority is pecuniary self interest”.
Pye (1965) sees the military as any obvious alternative to a democratic government, as “possible saviours” where there is a “sense of failure” by the political class in the country.
African Military and Professionalism
Military professionalism is a two-way traffic. Civilian and military officials agree not to cross the divide into each others’ affairs. A professional military enjoys considerable jurisdiction in military matters: selection and promotion of personnel based on merit, command, control, communication, intelligence and logistics done under military hierarchy. It also accepts state control and subsumes sub regional loyalties. Where professionalism is the rule unpopular military incursions into “foreign” terrain are resisted. But in most African states the civil-military divide has been breached by civilians attempting to manipulate military affairs, and by the military officers who pursue political control of the state. The consequence of this is that since 1963, Africa has witnessed about ninety military coups. In both Chad and Uganda former insurgents have assumed power. In the 1990s, the armies in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone collapsed entirely. Botswana has enjoyed relative stability from insurgency, while the militaries in Senegal and Zambia have not staged coups (Howe 2001: 2-5).
We can now identity factors that have contributed to lack of professionalism in African military institution.
i. Personal Rule: In Africa personal rulers are more concerned for political loyalty rather than that military efficiency. Since the interests of the new regimes and rulers, rather than those of the state are more paramount to African leaders, they prefer to sacrifice long-term institutionalization for short-term political expediency. According to Michael Schatzbeg, “One of the things Mobutu fears most is an effective military establishment”. To assure him of loyalty of the military, Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone made the military an extension of his party - All Peoples Congress (APC).
ii.Ethnic Recruitment: In Africa personal rule is closely linked with the ethnicization of the military. Crawford young (1994) has observed that “the very nature of personal autocracy led rulers to build armies according to ethnic map”. In Liberia Samuel Doe appointed fellow Krahn, a group that comprised 4 percent of the country’s population to top military posts. Siad Barre also transformed the Somali armed forces into a faction of the Maraheen ethnic group. In Kenya, Jomo removed soldiers of kamba extraction and replaced them with his Kikuyi tribesman.
iii.Lop Sided Promotion: Rapid promotion which led to early retirements of competent officers robbed African military of expertise at the top echelons, and promoted patron-client syndrome. In Uganda, Idi Amin, within ten years, rose from effendi rank (between non-commissioned to a commissioned) to general. Coups de tat also depleted the military of seasoned officers, fractured existing command structure, and sowed the seeds of counter coups in many African states.
iv.Domestic Deployment: Militaries have been traditionally trained for external combat. But in Africa they have been repeatedly engaged to suppress domestic uprising. Its notable effect is to narrow the division between civilian and military autonomy, weakens the force’s unity, diminish its acceptance by the society as a neutral force, and reduces its external capabilities.
v.Creation of Parallel Forces: In Africa, due to rulers’ fears and suspicions of the regular force, they have promoted the idea of parallel security forces, as counter-weights. In the 1960s, Nkrumah had his President’s Own Guard Regiment (POGR), Siaka Stevens’s Special Security Division, Mobutu sese seko’s Division specials Presidentielle and Sanni Abacha’s Special Body Guard service. It is common for these parallel forces to prosper at the expense of the army, thus eroding on professionalism. Indeed, Kenya Services Unit, created by Daniel Arap Moi, was reputed to be capable of defeating the entire army by itself (Howe 2001.44)
vi.Corruption: By focusing officer’s attention on private gains, corruption continues to undermine professionalism in African military. In Nigeria, for example the settlement device was extended by Babangida to the military establishment. In Uganda, President Museveni could not act against General Salim Saleh, half brother and hero of the guerrilla struggle, even after he was indicted for corruption. The list is longer. Biya of Cameroon has his Beti, Eyadema of Togo had his Kabre and Moi of Kenya, his Kalenjin. Commenting on this unholy union, Decalo (1989) wrote “the glue binding military elites to civilian authority is pecuniary self interest”.
Pye (1965) sees the military as any obvious alternative to a democratic government, as “possible saviours” where there is a “sense of failure” by the political class in the country.
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